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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE
TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION ACT TO REDRESS
PHILIPPINE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
Riza De Jesus
Abstract- The Torture Victim Protection Act CTVPA) was enacted in 1992 to
establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action in U.S. courts for torture committed
in foreign nations. Because the statutory language and legislative history did not address
the issue of retroactivity, courts are left with the task of determining whether the TVPA
applies to pending cases and pre-enactment conduct. As demonstrated in In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, a retroactive application of the statute does not result
in manifest injustice. The TVPA does not alter substantive rights and liabilities and
merely clarifies existing law prohibiting torture. In conformance with principles of
equity and rules of statutory construction, the TVPA should apply retroactively to claims
based on conduct that occurred prior to its enactment.
INTRODUCTION
Passage of the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) 1 sent a clear
message to the international community that the United States denounces
the use of torture regardless of where it occurs. By extending civil
jurisdiction to acts of torture committed in foreign countries, the United
States proclaimed that it will not provide a safe haven for torturers.2 The
TVPA also set a standard for other nations to develop more effective
domestic remedies in their human rights laws.3
Passage of the Act, however, left unanswered the question of whether
the TVPA provides a cause of action for victims that were tortured prior to
its enactment. Pending and future cases based on pre-enactment conduct are
relying on retroactive application of the law to seek redress for violations.
In most cases, these victims have been deprived of justice within their own
repressive legal systems.
At the time of the TVPA's enactment on March 12, 1992, the case of
In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation4 was being
1 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 [codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 note (West Supp. 1993)].
2 S. Rep. No. 249,102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,88.
4 In Re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, MDL No. 840 (D. Haw. filed Sept.
13, 1990), appeal pending, No. 92-15526 (9th Cir.). The following cases were consolidated for trial:
Ortigas v. Marcos, No. 86-0975 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 4, 1986); Clemente v. Marcos, No. 86-1449 (NJ).
Cal. filed Mar. 20, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos, No. 86-0390 (D. Haw. filed June 3, 1986); De Vera v. Marcos,
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tried by jury in federal court. It was the first class-action civil suit in the
United States alleging human rights violations in a foreign country. Ten
thousand plaintiffs sued the Marcos estate based on evidence documenting
more than 2,500 summary executions, more than 5,500 acts of torture and
783 disappearances of opponents of the Marcos regime.5
After Congress passed the Act, the issue arose in Marcos as to
whether the TVPA should apply retroactively to violative conduct that
occurred in the Philippines prior to 1992. The court allowed the TVPA
claim,6 and the jury found the Marcos estate liable for human rights
violations that took place during his administration.7
Pending an appellate decision on the Marcos case, courts are still
faced with interpreting a statute that is silent on the issue of retroactivity.8
Supreme Court precedents are conflicting. A final resolution of the issue is
needed to guide the courts and to advise pending and future claimants in
proceeding with their claims.9
This Comment examines the retroactivity doctrine and its
applicability to claims based on conduct that occurred prior to the enactment
of the Torture Victim Protection Act. Part I presents an overview of the
provisions and legislative history of the TVPA. Part II addresses the debate
on whether congressional enactments and regulations should have
retroactive or prospective application. Part HI provides guidance from case
law in reconciling the conflicting doctrines, focusing on the distinction
No. 86-0333 (D. Haw. filed May 8, 1986); Sison v. Marcos, No. 86-0225 (D. Haw. filed Mar. 26, 1986);
Piopongco v. Marcos, No. 87-0138 (D. Haw. filed Feb. 25, 1987).
5 On Nov. 20, 1991, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to freeze Marcos' worldwide
assets. Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Marcos (MDL No. 840). An appeal
of the injunction is pending in the Ninth Circuit. Marcos, No. 92-15526.
6 Pretrial Order No. 5: Case Management, Marcos (MDL No. 840) (granting plaintiffs' motion to
amend the pleadings to include the Torture Victim Protection Act as a cause of action by plaintiffs joint
pretrial statement filed on Jan. 13, 1992). The district court in Marcos is the first to allow a TVPA claim
alleging acts that occurred prior to its passage; however, no written opinion was issued.
7 The bifurcated trial concluded the liability phase with ajury verdict on Sept. 24, 1992, but damages
are still being determined.
8 Following Marcos, other cases were filed based on TVPA claims, including: Todd v. Panjaitan,
No. 92-12255 WD (D.Mass. 1992) (action against Indonesian military commander for the summary exe-
cution of an Indonesian citizen); Xuncax v. Gramajo, No. 91-11564 WD (D. Mass. 1991) and Ortiz v.
Gramajo, No. 91-11612 WD (D. Mass. 1991) (actions against Guatemalan official for gross human rights
violations). The issue of retroactivity in these cases is still pending in the district courts. A TVPA claim
was also made in Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 190-CV-2010-GET (N.D. Ga. 1992); however, the court did
not decide the application of the TVPA and found jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
9 The Supreme Court has the opportunity to resolve the issue when it decides whether the 1991 Civil
Rights Act is retroactive in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-757) and Rivers v. Roadway Express, 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-938).
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between substantive and procedural statutes in determining retroactivity.
Part IV proposes an analytic framework to resolve the question of
retroactivity of the TVPA and finds that a policy in favor of retroactive
application is proper as demonstrated in Marcos. This Comment concludes
that retroactivity of the TVPA is consistent with its procedural nature and
therefore the statute should be applicable to pending cases.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE TVPA
A. Statutory Provisions
The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992 provides a forum for
victims to sue their torturers in U.S. federal courts, so long as personal
jurisdiction can be exercised over the defendants. 10 Civil liability under the
TVPA extends to "an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation" subjects an individual to torture or extra-
judicial killing." A person can be held liable for authorizing, tolerating or
knowingly ignoring acts of torture. 12 It is not necessary for the person to
have personally performed or ordered the abuses.
13
The TVPA incorporates the definition of torture and extrajudicial
killing found in contemporary international law. Its definition of torture is
drawn from the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention) which was
adopted by the United Nations in 1984.14 It also contains verbatim the
10 S. Rep. No. 249 at 7.
11 Torture Victim Protection Act § 2 (a).
12 S. Rep. No. 249 at 9.
13 ld.
14 G.A. Res. 39/46,39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doec. A/Res/39108 (1984), reprinted
in 23 LL.M. 1027 (1984); Torture Victim Protection Act § 3(b):
(1) the term "torture" means any act, directed against an individual in the offender's custody or
physical control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain arising only from or inherent in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for
such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing
that individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from
A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;
B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering
substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
C) the threat of imminent death; or
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understandings included in the definition by the Senate when it ratified the
Torture Convention in 1990.15 Extrajudicial killing, as defined in the
statute, conforms with the definition contained in the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.16 The principle that the right to life may not be extinguished by
extrajudicial means is embodied in several other international instruments. 17
To guard against a flood of litigation, the TVPA provides for a ten-
year statute of limitations.18 A claimant must have exhausted all available
remedies in the country in which the torture occurred before federal court
jurisdiction can be granted. 19 Furthermore, the defendant must have
"minimum contacts" with the forum state before he or she can be sued in
federal court.20
B. Legislative History and Intent
Following a series of hearings before the House and the Senate on the
continuing problem of torture, the United States adopted a joint resolution
on torture in 1984. The resolution undertook to develop concrete
mechanisms to help combat torture throughout the world. It specifically
called for the "enactment and vigorous implementation of laws intended to
reinforce the United States policies with respect to torture."21 Passage of the
TVPA was a step toward fulfillment of that mandate.22
D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or procedures calculated to
disruptprofoundly the senses or personality.
1 136 CONG. REc. S17,491, understandings l(a)-(b) (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
16 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3,6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362,75 U.N.T.S. 31; Torture Victim Protection Act §
3(a):
For the purposes of this Act, the term "extrajudicial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized
by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any
such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.
17 See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36,
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. A/16 (entered into force July 18, 1978); European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 2, 1968 Europ. T.S. No. 5. 213
U.N.T.S. 221; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19,1966, art. 6, G.A. Res. 2200A,
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967).
18 Torture Victim Protection Act § 2(c).
19 Id. at § 2(b).
20 S. Rep. No. 249 at 7 [citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)].
21 Pub. L. No. 98-447, 98 Stat. 1721 (1984), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2656 note (1988).
22 S. Rep. No. 249 at 3.
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The Act was intended to clarify and expand existing law under the
Alien Tort Claims Act,23 which allows federal district courts to adjudicate
claims by aliens for torts committed "in violation of the law of nations."24
In the landmark decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,25 the Alien Tort Claims
Act was found to be a proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction over alien
perpetrators of torture. Citizens of Paraguay brought suit in federal court
against a former Paraguayan official for torturing to death a family member
of the plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling. It
construed the "law of nations" to apply broadly, recognizing that the
universal condemnation of torture had ripened into a rule of customary
international law such that torture falls squarely within the language of the
statute.26
Despite the decision in Filartiga, there remained the question of
whether the Alien Tort Claims Act was in fact an appropriate basis for a
cause of action against torture, absent an explicit grant from Congress.
Judge Robert H. Bork raised this concern in his concurrence in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, where he reasoned that the separation of powers
doctrine mandated such an explicit grant in cases affecting foreign
relations.27
In effect, the Torture Victim Protection Act provided such a grant. It
codified the Filartiga ruling, establishing an unambiguous basis for actions
previously maintained under the Alien Tort Claims Act.28 The TVPA made
it explicit that individual victims have a private right of action in U.S.
courts. It specifically addressed official torture and summary executions,
recognizing their devastating effects. At the same time, the TVPA expanded
the availability of the remedy. Whereas the Alien Tort Claims Act afforded
a remedy for tort claims of aliens only, the TVPA extended the civil remedy
to U.S. citizens who were victims of torture in foreign countries.
29
23 IL at 4-5.
24 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). The Alien Tort Claims Act was originally a provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
25 Flartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
26 Id. at 884-85.
27 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-808 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In a per curiam
decision, the court affirmed the dismissal of a claim against the perpetrators of a terrorist attack in Israel.
Each member of the panel in the D.C. Circuit Court wrote a separate concurring opinion, urging dismissal
on other grounds.
28 S. Rep. No. 249 at 4.
29 Id. at5.
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Nevertheless, the TVPA was not meant to supplant the existing law.30
Claims based on torture and summary executions are not the only actions
covered by the Alien Tort Claims Act. That statute remains intact to allow
suits based on violations of other international legal norms.
C. Congress'Authority to Confer Jurisdiction
The power of Congress to grant jurisdiction to federal courts over
alien victims of torture is derived from the Constitution. Article II of the
Constitution provides that the federal judiciary has the power to adjudicate
cases 'arising under' the laws of the United States. The 'arising under'
clause authorizes Congress to confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts to hear
claims brought by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants. 31
Furthermore, the Constitution authorizes Congress "to define and punish...
Offenses against the Law of Nations."32
International law also provides an underlying basis for the power of
Congress to enact the TVPA. The Supreme Court has held that international
law is part of U.S. law.33 The doctrine of universal jurisdiction provides that
the courts of all nations have jurisdiction over offenses of universal
concern.34 Filartiga construed this doctrine to allow U.S. courts to hear a
civil suit by a victim of torture that occurred overseas. 35
The Torture Convention, which requires adherent states including the
United States to adopt measures against human rights abusers, is a clear
statement that international law condemns torture and extrajudicial
killings. 36 Congress' enactment of the TVPA serves to implement the terms
of the Convention.37
30 Id.
31 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983). The Verlinden court granted
subject-matter jurisdiction to an action by foreign plaintiffs under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
upon determining that it raised a question of federal law.
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
33 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
34 RESTATEMENT C(iTRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
35 Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
36 138 CONG. Rrc. S2668 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1992).
37 S. Rep. No. 249 at 3. In Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493,499-500 (9th Cir. 1992), the defendant-
appellant pointed out that the Senate attached an understanding to Article 14 of the Torture Convention that
required a state to provide a right of action only for torture committed in territory under its jurisdiction.
See 136 CoNG. REC. S17,486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). While this mandates the United States to enforce
the rights of victims of torture occurring within its borders, the court found that the understanding does not
go so far as to prohibit the United States from providing a forum for claims by aliens for torture occurring
elsewhere.
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The embodiment of the key provisions of the TVPA in international
law is a clear indication of universal acceptance of its principles. Torture is
of such fundamental concern to the international community that the legal
principles guarding against it have acquired the status of jus cogens, or a
peremptory norm of international law.38 The right of the individual to be
free from torture has existed long before the passage of the TVPA.
Accordingly, in determining whether the statute should apply retroactively,
it is important to consider that the TVPA redresses conduct that has been
widely condemned under established law.
II. CONFLICT IN THE COURTS: RETROACTIVrTY VS. POSPECIVITY
Rules of statutory construction require courts to discern the intent of
the legislature by examining the plain language of the statute and its legisla-
tive history.39 Absent clear legislative intent, it is not settled in the law
whether a congressional enactment should apply retroactively or prospec-
tively. Federal courts seeking guidance from Supreme Court precedents are
faced with conflicting approaches on the retroactivity doctrine. The rules
are embodied in two distinct lines of cases-one holding that retroactivity is
disfavored, and the other establishing a presumption of retroactive applica-
tion. 0
A. The Bowen Line of Reasoning
The historical presumption against retroactivity was articulated by the
court in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, which held that
38 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 ("[Flor purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the
pirate and the slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind").
39 Sutherland Stat Const §§ 47.01, 48.03 (5th ed. 1992).
40 The two lines of reasoning are embodied in Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696
(1974) and Bowen v. Georgetown Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
For courts applying the Bradley line of precedent in favor of retroactivity, see Aledo-Garcia v.
Puerto Rico Nat'l Guard Fund, Inc., 887 F.2d 354, 355 (1st Cir. 1989); Scarbdro v. First American Nat'l
Bank of Nashville, 619 F.2d 621,622 (6th Cir. 1980); FDIC v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089, 1095-97 (7th Cir.
1991); Kruso v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Peppertree
Apartments, 942 F.2d 1555, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1991). For courts adopting the Bowen line of reasoning
against retroactivity, see Leland v. Federal Ins. Adm'r, 934 F.2d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1991); Simmons v.
Lockhart, 931 F.2d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir. 1991); De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d
1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 924 (D.C. Cit. 1991); Sargisson v.
United States, 913 F.2d 918, 922-23 (Fed. Cit. 1990). For a list of district courts that have decided either
in favor of or against retroactivity, see Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, app. at 1383-84
(8th Cir. 1992).
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"retroactivity is not favored in the law."41  In Bowen, several hospitals
providing Medicare services challenged a regulation issued by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services tfiat altered the 1981 wage-index rule used to
calculate reimbursable wage costs.42 The Medicare Act authorized the
Secretary to promulgate regulations setting limits on reimbursable Medicare
costs, but did not expressly sanction retroactive rulemaking. Absent such an
explicit grant, the Bowen court held that the Secretary of Health and Human
Services was not authorized to promulgate retroactive cost-limit rules.43
The Court further stated that because the effect of extending
regulation to the past is drastic, it should not be allowed unless Congress
expressly provides to that effect.4  An examination of the statutory
language showed that the retroactivity provision applied only to case-by-
case adjudication by the agency, not to the general power of rulemaking. 45
Further, the legislative history indicated that Congress considered the need
for making retroactive corrective adjustments, yet did not make any express
authorization for retroactive cost-limit rules.46 The Court concluded that
had Congress intended the Secretary to promulgate retroactive regulations,
this intent would have been made explicit. 47
Bowen plainly refers to "the principle that statutes operate only
prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively."48 Unless
Congress directs otherwise, the unyielding rule is that "legislation must be
considered as addressed to the future, not to the past."49 Thus, under Bowen,
retroactive application is not permitted without a clear statement by
Congress to this effect.
41 Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208 [citing, e.g., Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge
Apartments Co. v. Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439 (1935);
United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928)].
42 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a district court decision that the
rule is invalid in recouping funds from Medicare service providers. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling
of the lower court.
43 Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208-09. The Supreme Court stated: "Even where some substantial justifica-
tion for retroactive rulemaking is present, courts should be reluctant to find such authority absent an
express statutory grant"
44 Id. at 208.
45 1&
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70,79 (1982).
49 1&. [quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 281 U.S. 190, 199 (1913)].
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B. The Bradley Line of Reasoning
In Bradley v. Richmond School Board, the Supreme Court endorsed
the opposite presumption.50 It held that "a court is to apply the law in effect
at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the
contrary."51 Bradley involved a class action brought by parents against the
School Board of Richmond, Virginia, to desegregate the public schools.
The Board appealed the award of attorney's fees made by the District Court.
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Education
Amendments of 1972, which granted federal courts authority to award
attorney's fees in desegregation cases. The Supreme Court upheld the
propriety of the fee award.52
The decision in Bradley reiterated the earlier case of Thorpe v.
Housing Authority of Durham.53 The Bradley court concluded from Thorpe
that even when the law does not explicitly provide that it is to be applied to
pending cases, it must be given effect.54 Insofar as the legislative history of
the Amendment was inconclusive, Bradley found that there was at least
implicit support for the application of the statute to pending cases.55
Following the Thorpe decision, Bradley observed that exceptions to the
general rule of retroactive application had been made to prevent manifest
injustice.56
In determining "manifest injustice" that would preclude retroactive
application of a statute, the Court examined three factors: (1) the nature and
identity of the parties; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the
impact of the change in law on pre-existing rights.57
In considering the first factor, the Court noted that a school
desegregation case such as Bradley is different from "mere private cases
between individuals."58 A disparity exists between the School Board and
the students-plaintiffs in their respective abilities to protect their interests.
50 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 724.
53 Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969). Thorpe stated the basic principle
that "an appellate court must apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision."
54 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715.
55 Id. at 716 n.23, 717. The Court stated that while there is no explicit statement that the provision
for attorney's fees awards may be applied to services rendered prior to enactment, the Court was "reluctant
specilically to read into the statute the very fee limitation that Congress eliminated."
56 ld. at 716-717.
57 Id. at 717-721.
58 Id. at718.
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The Court also referred to United States v. Schooner Peggy, which
concluded that in matters of "great national concerns... the court must
decide according to existing laws."59 The numerous concerns expressed in
Congress on the significance of the Education Amendments Act supported
its status as a matter of "great national concern" according to the Bradley
court.
The second aspect of concern in Bradley pertained to the nature of the
rights affected by the change in the law. The Court rejected the application
of an intervening law to a pending claim where it has found that to do so
would "infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or
become unconditional."'6 Since the School Board operated on taxpayers'
funds, it could not be claimed that the Board had such a right to funds held
in public trust 61
The third concern that determined the Bradley decision was that the
law did not impose new or unanticipated obligations on a party without
notice or an opportunity to be heard.62 Under common law, the Board could
have been liable for attorney's fees. The statute merely provided an
additional basis upon which the Board's potential obligation to pay
attorney's fees arises.63 Hence it was unlikely that the Board would have
acted differently had the statute been operating. 64  The substantive
obligation of the parties remained unchanged. Moreover, no additional
burden was imposed because the statutory provision did not alter the Board's
responsibility to provide non-discriminatory education to the public.
65
Upon consideration of these factors, the Bradley court found no
manifest injustice in applying the statute to a pending claim for services
rendered prior to the enactment of the statute.
C. Unreconciled Doctrines
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, the court ac-
knowledged the "apparent tension" in the Bradley and Bowen cases, but
declined to follow either approach.6 6 The plaintiff in Bonjorno sought to
have a post-judgment interest statute applied retroactively to his federal
59 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801).
60 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
61 Id.
62 d.
63 Id. at721.
64 d
65 Id
66 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827,837 (1990).
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antitrust judgment. The Court simply found that the plain language of the
statute showed clear congressional intent that the amended statute is not
applicable to judgments entered before its enactment.67 Since under either
the Bradley or Bowen view, "where congressional intent is clear, it
governs," the Court obviated the need to reconcile the two lines of
reasoning.68
As yet, the Supreme Court has failed to resolve the conflicting doc-
trines, instead allowing them to coexist 69 The foundations for the Bradley
and Bowen presumptions have not been examined in depth to effect a clear
policy. Without a clear directive from the Supreme Court, litigants are sub-
ject to the divided policy preferences of the federal courts.
Ill. CASE LAW SUPPORT FOR RETROACTIVITY
Without a statutory provision or legislative history on whether the
TVPA should apply retroactively or prospectively, federal courts must turn
to case law for guidance. While courts remain split on the issue, a wave of
decisions concerning the Civil Rights Act, the Civil Rights Restoration Act
and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act indicates an identifiable trend,
One way that the courts have attempted to resolve the retroactivity dilemma
is by distinguishing between substantive and procedural rights.
A. Substantive /Non-substantive Distinction
Courts have made a distinction between the substantive and
procedural nature of statutes in order to reconcile Bradley and Bowen.
These courts reasoned that Bradley dictates the retroactive application of
statutes affecting procedural rights, while Bowen assumes prospective
application of the law where it changes substantive rights.
70
The Supreme Court in Winfree v. Northern Pacific Railway held that
a statute is construed as substantive and not remedial where it "introduced a
new policy and quite radically changed the existing law."71 In determining
that a statute which repealed a common law limitation of liability should
67 Id
68 Id.
69 See supra note 9.
70 See Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985) (holding that substantive provisions of federal
grant program do not apply retroactively where it would require repayment of funds received in prior years
under different requirements); see also Knrso, 872 F.2d at 1425 (allowing retroactive application of statute
that affects procedural rights).
71 Winfree v. N. Pac. Ry., 227 U.S. 296,302 (1913).
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have prospective effect only, it stated that the enactment "takes away
material defenses, defenses which did something more than resist the
remedy; they disproved the right of action. Such defenses the statute takes
away, and that none may exist in the present case is immaterial. It is the
operation of the statute which determines its character." 72
A non-substantive statute, on the other hand, merely affects
procedures or remedies. 73 In operating remedially, it "neither enlarges nor
impairs substantive rights but relates to the means and procedures for
enforcement of those rights."74 Some courts have further delineated non-
substantive statutes from substantive statutes for purposes of analyzing their
retroactivity by asking whether either party would have acted differently if
the statute had been in effect at the time.75 Notably, the First Circuit held
that "the touchstone for deciding the question of retroactivity is whether
retroactive application of a newly announced principle would alter
substantive rules of conduct and disappoint private expectations." 76 This
approach suggests a balancing of public interest in enforcement of new rules
and private interest in confirming expectations.
The conflict between the Bradley and Bowen approaches may be
resolved by distinguishing their factual bases. Bradley dealt with the issue
of whether an attorney's fees statute enacted while a case was pending on
appeal should apply retroactively. The statute did not create an additional
source of liability. Because the statute did not change the substantive
obligation of the parties, the Court allowed its retroactive application. On
the other hand, Bowen involved the application of a cost-limit rule that
required hospitals to return to the federal government money they had been
paid under prior reimbursement standards. Prospective application is
appropriate in Bowen where the new provision affected substantive rights
and liabilities.77
Federal courts have utilized the substantive-procedural distinction to
resolve retroactivity issues in cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act and the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, as well as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act. An examination of these cases highlights the significance of making
such a distinction in interpreting the TVPA.
72 Id.
73 See Friel v. Cessna Aircraft, 751 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1985).
74 United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1381 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
75 Friel, 751 F.2d at 1039; Alexander v. Robinson, 756 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1985).
76 C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical Contractors v. N.L.R.B., 921 F.2d 350,357-58 n.7 (lst Cir. 1990).
77 See Bennett, 470 U.S. at 639-40.
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1. Cases Involving the Civil Rights Laws
Faced with the dual approaches of Bradley and Bowen, federal courts
struggled with the retroactivity dilemma in a series of cases involving the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.78 The court in Lussier v. Dugger
relied primarily on the fact that the purpose of the legislation was purely
remedial.79 It held that the statute applied retroactively to permit the
plaintiff to maintain an action against his former employer for employment
discrimination. 80 The court found that since the employer was a state
governmental agency, the rights of private parties-the real concern of
Bradley's manifest injustice exception-were not implicated by retroactive
application of the amendment. Thus, retroactive application did not result in
manifest injustice.81
The Civil Rights Restoration Act did not change prior legislation, but
rather clarified judicial interpretations that unduly restricted the application
of the civil rights laws.82 Lussier relied on language declaring that the
statute will "restore" and "clarify" Congress' original intent and found this
purpose consistent with retroactive application.83 Further, the Restoration
Act did not change eligibility requirements under a pre-existing grant
program. Its objective was wholly remedial, that is, to "assist in the struggle
to eliminate discrimination from our society by ending federal subsidies of
such discrimination."'84
The fact that the Restoration Act was enacted specifically to overturn
restrictive court rulings is accorded great weight in determining its
retroactivity. The court in Ayers v. Allain pronounced the rule that
retroactive legislation is proper "when Congress enacts the statute to clarify
the Supreme Court's interpretation of previous legislation thereby returning
the law to its previous posture."85 In Ayers, black citizens of Mississippi
filed a class action against state officials alleging that the racially segregated
system of education violated the Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The district court dismissed the case, relying on a restrictive statutory
interpretation. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the claim after the passage of the
78 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) [codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C. (1988)].
79 Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
80 Id
81 Id at666.
82 Supra note 78.
83 Lussier, 904 F.2d at 666.
84 Id.
85 Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732,754-55 (5th Cir. 1990).
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Restoration Act and upheld a retroactive application of the statute.
Examining the legislative history of the Restoration Act, the court
determined that Congress clearly intended to overturn earlier judicial
misinterpretations. 86 This restorative effect of the statute distinguishes it
from a substantive law that results in inequities when applied retroactively.
Like the Restoration Act, the Civil Rights Act of 199187 sought to
remedy the Supreme Court's narrow reading of the civil rights statutes.
Nonetheless, the 1991 Act made no reference to retroactivity in its statutory
language or legislative history. It contained ambiguous language as to the
effective date of the amendments.8 8 Consequently, federal courts construing
the Act did not have a clear guide as to its application to pending cases. In
Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, the court held that the Civil Rights Act did not
apply retroactively because it affected the parties' "substantive rights and
liabilities."89 Vogel involved a discrimination action seeking retroactive
benefits for a plaintiff who had been initially denied employment by the
police department but who eventually joined later recruits.90 The court
declined to apply the 1991 Act to the plaintiffs claim for damages resulting
from the affirmative action hiring policy that the police department adopted
pursuant to a 1981 consent decree.91
The Vogel court did not explain how it reached its finding that
"clearly, retroactive application of the 1991 Act would affect substantive
rights and liabilities of the parties to this action."92  Nonetheless, it
expressed reliance upon its earlier decision in United States v. Murphy,93
involving a statutory amendment that changed the showing of knowledge
required for imposition of civil liability. The Sixth Circuit denied
retroactive application in Murphy because the amendment created an
additional source of liability in relation to a past transaction, thereby
affecting substantive rights and liabilities. 94
In sum, these holdings recognize a distinction between statutes that
effect changes in substantive areas and those that serve a clarifying or
86 1&
87 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
88 The effective date provision of the Civil Rights Act states that "feixcept as otherwise specifically
provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 402(a).
89 Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594,598 (6th Cir. 1992).
90 Id.
91 Id
92 Vogel, 959 F.2d at 598. The concurring judge declined to join the majority opinion on retroac-
tivity because the issue had not been addressed by the parties.
93 United States v. Murphy, 937 F.2d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1991).
94Id.
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restorative purpose. Statutes that alter substantive rights and liabilities
would result in manifest injustice if they are permitted retroactive
application.95 Thus, they are presumed to apply prospectively only.96 On
the other hand, statutes that are remedial or procedural in nature apply
retroactively,97 in accordance with the traditional principle that courts are to
apply the law in effect at the time of decision.
2. Retroactivity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The question of retroactivity has also arisen in the context of applica-
bility of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which
confers subject matter jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. 98 The language
and legislative history of the FSIA do not provide a clear mandate for
retroactivity. Without such an unequivocal statement, some courts have held
that the FSIA does not apply retroactively. 99
The leading case on the issue of retroactivity of the FSIA is Jackson
v. People's Republic of China, where U.S. plaintiffs sued to recover on
bonds issued by the Chinese government in 1911, relying on the FSIA to
deny immunity. 100 The Chinese government failed to make interest
payments on the bonds long before 1976, when the FSIA was enacted. The
district court vacated a default judgment for the plaintiffs in light of U.S.
foreign policy interests, ultimately dismissing the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling
that the FSIA did not apply to transactions that predated 1952.101
Examining the effect of retroactivity on antecedent rights of China, the court
concluded that it would be "manifestly unfair for the United States to
modify the immunity afforded a foreign state in 1911 by the enactment of a
statute nearly three quarters of a century later."102
As Jackson indicates, in claims involving acts that occurred prior to
1952, retroactive application of the FSIA would interfere with antecedent
95 National wildlife Federation v. Marsh, 747 F.2d 616, 620-21 (1lth Cir. 1984) (holding that a
housing development grant recipient had a vested right which could not be disturbed by retroactive
application of an amended statute without causing manifest injustice).
96 Bennett, 470 U.S. at 639.
97 United States v. Vanella, 619 F.2d 384,386 (5th Cir. 1980).
98 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1602-1611 (1988).
99 Slade v. Mexico, 617 F. Supp. 351 (D.D.C. 1985), affidmein., 790 F.2d 163 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Carl
Marks & Co. v. U.S.S.R., 665 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988).
100 Jackson v. Peoples Republic of China, 596 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1984), affid, 794 F.2d 1490
(11th Cir. 1986).
101 Id. at 1497.
102 Id.
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rights because U.S. courts granted foreign sovereigns absolute immunity
from suit during that period.103 However, the significance of the court's
ruling is limited to the time frame within which the underlying transactions
occurred. Jackson addressed the issue of retroactivity only in cases
involving pre-1952 events. It leaves open the question of whether the FSIA
should apply retroactively to claims arising from activities that took place
between 1952 and January 1977, the effective date of the FSIA. In 1952,
the State Department, through the "Tate Letter," adopted the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, directing that a foreign state be grantedimmunity only for its public acts and not for its commercial acts. 104
Enactment of the FSIA in 1976 codified and clarified this post-1952
practice. 105 Hence, between 1952 and 1977 foreign states could no longer
reasonably rely on expectations of absolute immunity. No expectation
interests would be defeated by retroactive application of the statute to
transactions that occurred during this latter period. 106
Whereas the FSIA can not be applied retroactively to a case such as
Jackson where the operative events occurred before 1952, it has a formally
retroactive effect on events occurring thereafter. The FSIA effected a
change in process by shifting the determination of the entitlement of foreign
states to immunity from the State Department to the judiciary. 107 In
substance, however, it did not alter the generally applicable rules of
immunities law. 108 A cause of action against foreign sovereigns for their
non-public activities existed even before enactment of the FSIA. It was the
Tate Letter's adoption of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity that
created a cause of action that had not existed before, against foreign states
for their commercial activities. 109 Thus, to deny retroactive effect to the
103 Insurance Co. of N. America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating
that in actions arising under the FSIA, the court must determine "whether that Act gives such clear notice
to foreign countries as to remove, as a reasonableness factor, the expectations of immunity of agencies of
foreign countries performing commercial functions").
04 Letter from Jack B. Tate, State Department Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682,711-15 (1976).
105 Slade, 617 F. Supp. at 357; see Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
106 At least one court has recognized that after 1952, it was "reasonable for a foreign sovereign to
anticifate being sued in the United States on commercial transactions." Carl Marks, 841 F.2d at 27.
07 GARY B. BORN AND DAVID WEST, INTERNATIONAL CSVIL LITIGATION IN UNrrED STATES
COURTS 453 (2d ed. 1992).
108 Id.
109 Schmidt v. Polish People's Republic, 742 F.2d 1022, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("[S]ince the Tate'
Letter of 1952 ... foreign sovereign immunity had not extended to the commercial activity of a foreign
state").
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FSIA in claims arising after 1952 would be to revert to the rule of absolute
immunity, not to the pre-1977 state of the law.
A significant analogy exists between the FSIA and the TVPA: the
FSIA codified the principles embodied in the Tate Letter, 110 while the
TVPA clarified the law established under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 1 For
purposes of analyzing the retroactive application of the TVPA to events that
occurred since the passage of the Alien Tort Claims Act, a parallel can be
drawn from cases arising under the FSIA where the cause of action accrued
after the issuance of the Tate Letter.
The FSIA has been applied retroactively to claims where the underly-
ing transactions occurred after 1952.112 In Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press
Agency, foreign agencies were sued in a libel action based on articles pub-
lished in 1976 and circulated in the United States. 113 The court held that
applying the FSIA to a claim where the cause of action accrued before its
effective date would not interfere with the antecedent rights of the parties.
1 14
It reasoned that the FSIA does not create new rights but merely codifies the
restrictive rule of sovereign immunity, which has been followed by the
courts and the executive branch ever since its adoption by the Department of
State.1 15 The FSIA affects the rights of parties only to the extent that it
expands the ability of plaintiffs to obtain judgments against foreign states.116
Overall, in making a distinction between the substantive and non-
substantive effect of statutes, courts are able to minimize the potentially
harsh effects of retroactivity. The absence of manifest injustice in situations
involving non-substantive changes in rights sets aside the need for Bowen's
clear-statement requirement for retroactivity.117 Certainly, with respect to
statutes that regulate new areas, retroactivity is problematic. But where a
110 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
111 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 638-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (retroactively applying FSIA provision that created a
basis for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant); Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr. Inc. v.
Makina Ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (holding that substantive
inmuniy principles in the FSIA applied to action commenced in 1976).
113 Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
114 Id at 851n.1.
115 d
116 Id. The court further determined that applying the FSIA to Yessenin gives effect to congressional
intent, relying on the language of the Preamble which states that "henceforth," claims of immunity should
be decided in accordance with the principles of the FSIA. See 28 U.S.C. 1602. But ef. Corporacion
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the
language in the Preamble was intended to apply only to the substantive law of foreign sovereign immunity
and declining to give the jurisdictional provisions retroactive effect).
117 See FDIC, 942 F.2d at 1095 n.6.
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statute does not interfere with substantive legal rights and obligations, its
application to pre-enactment conduct is appropriate.
IV. RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF RETROACIVITY IN THE TVPA
Applying the Bradley doctrine in determining retroactivity of the
Torture Victim Protection Act would lead to well-reasoned decisions
because Bradley does not mandate a result and instead follows a deliberative
approach. To balance public and private interests, this Comment suggests a
second prong to the Bradley approach that would ensure a more equitable
outcome. Under the proposed analytic framework, the application of the
statute to pending cases is consistent with fundamental fairness.
A. Bradley: The Better Rule
The Bowen line of cases directs the courts to apply statutes prospec-
tively, absent a clear congressional mandate of retroactivity. Thus, under
Bowen, the TVPA would simply not apply to pending cases because its
statutory language and legislative history does not address the issue of retro-
activity. However, for a statute to apply to a pending case, it is not
necessary to find explicit support for retroactive application in its language
or legislative history.118 Statutes are enacted for different purposes, yet the
clear-statement rule of Bowen gives them uniform treatment. 119 Bowen's
clear-statement requirement is flawed in its imposition of a strict
presumption without searching for statutory meaning. 120
More specifically, the Bowen approach is unavailing in TVPA cases
because it presumes prospectivity without an examination of the statute's
implications in the human rights context. The Bradley rule is more
appropriate because it does not mandate a result and takes into account
fairness concerns by employing a manifest injustice test on a case-by-case
basis. Further, the Bradley rule minimizes the potentially harsh impact of
retroactivity by providing two exceptions to retroactive application. The
presumption that courts are to apply the law in effect at the time of decision
118 Hicks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 738 F. Supp. 279,284 (E.D. IM. 1990).
119 Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending
Cases, 90 ICH. L. REv. 2035,2049 (1992).
120 A clear-statement rule requires explicit authorization in order to ascertain intent, thereby disen-
gaging courts from reasoning from a statute's legislative history. Courts that operate under this rule reach a
substantive decision without critically examining the choices involved in that decision. See generally Note,
Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law. Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV.
L. REv. 892, 898 (1982).
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does not govern where doing so would result in manifest injustice, or where
there is legislative intent to the contrary.121
Thus, whereas Bowen applies a strict test without due consideration of
the implications of particular laws, the Bradley test relies on more
substantial justification in interpreting statutes. When a court, lacking
justification, applies the clear-statement rule to a vague statute, it shuns its
judicial obligation to interpret laws.122 In this respect, Bradley is the better
rule in that its manifest injustice test involves more rigorous examination.
Furthermore, the TVPA's grant of a jurisdictional forum over foreign
defendants is analogous in effect to the statutory provision in Bradley,
where the rights involved were more procedural than substantive in nature.
Like the attorney's fees provision in Bradley, the TVPA merely provides an
additional basis for liability that was embodied in already existing law. In
Bradley, the fee award had a common-law basis; in the TVPA, the cause of
action existed under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 123 Finally, both the TVPA
and the regulation in Bradley were ambiguous on the subject of
retroactivity, whereas the statutory language and legislative history in
Bowen were indicative of congressional intent. These facts suggest that the
TVPA should be subject to scrutiny as outlined by the Bradley court.
B. Bases for Retroactive Application of the TVPA
1. Applying the TVPA Retroactively Would Not Create Manifest
Injustice
An examination of Marcos in light of the Bradley rule demonstrates
the appropriateness of a ruling of retroactivity governing TVPA claims.
Under the Bradley presumption, the TVPA properly applies to Marcos since
the statute's legislative history does not evince an intent for prospective
application only. Further, using the three-part test in Bradley, no manifest
injustice results from applying the statute retroactively to Marcos.
The first factor in determining manifest injustice is concerned with
the public versus private nature of the dispute between the parties. 124 This
121 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711.
122 Estrin, supra note 119.
123 Although only aliens are entitled to invoke the Alien Tort Claims Act, U.S. citizens may be able
to base jurisdiction over torture claims against foreign defendants on general federal question jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). Cases arising under international law are within the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. RESTATmoEN r(TRD) oFFoRGNR LXInoNSLAw § 111(2) (1987).
124 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 718-19.
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factor weighs heavily in support of retroactivity where issues of important
public policy or national concern, rather than mere private disputes, are
involved.125 In the case of the TVPA, its provisions address a major area of
concern for the United States: the protection of human rights throughout the
world. To this end, the enactment of the TVPA promotes deterrence of
torture and extrajudicial killing by providing a forum for prosecuting
violators. The Marcos case involves more than just an isolated act of
torture. It involves a pattern of torture and extrajudicial killing involving
thousands of private citizens. Clearly, it is a case which involves a matter of
tremendous public concern. 126
The disadvantaged parties in Marcos are private individuals who have
suffered grievous harm in the hands of the Philippine government and its
ruling family. The public's substantial concern for human rights outweighs
the private concerns of the defendant. Accordingly, an assessment of the
nature and identity of the parties points in favor of retroactive application of
the TVPA.
The second consideration, the nature of the rights, is intended to
guard against infringing upon rights that have "matured or become
unconditional." 127 This case does not affect any antecedent rights vesting
prior to the enactment date.128 No one, including the defendant, has a
guaranteed right to commit torture with impunity. The TVPA merely
expands the remedy previously available under the Alien Tort Claims Act to
include both aliens and U.S. citizens. There is no matured or unconditional
right which the defendant would lose through retroactive application of the
Act.
The third criterion, the nature of the impact of the new law upon
existing rights, addresses the possibility that new and unanticipated
obligations may be imposed upon a party without notice or an opportunity
to be heard. The issue is whether the new obligation imposed by the statute,
if known, would have caused the defendant to alter his conduct.129
The TVPA does not impose any new or unanticipated obligations
upon any party in this case. Nor can it be seriously maintained that Marcos
would have altered his conduct in light of the TVPA had he known of its
125 Id. at 717-18.
126 See, e.g., DeGurles v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 833 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir.
1987) (noting that immigration policy is a matter of great national concern); Stender, 780 F. Supp. at 1307
(stating that remedying discrimination and promoting equality through the Civil Rights Act is of great
public concern).
127 Bradley. 416 U.S. at 720.
128 See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 809 F.2d 563, 575 (9th Cir. 1987).
129 Bradley, 416 U.S. at 721.
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possible application at the time, judging from the pattern and gravity of the
torturous acts committed during his regime. The fact that torture is a
flagrant human rights violation should have come as no surprise. The
Philippine Constitution prohibits torture and provides that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land."130 Clearly, the defendant had a legal obligation not to
engage in torture even prior to enactment of the TVPA, yet he pursued his
course of conduct with conscious knowledge of its potential for liability.
Thus, under the Bradley criteria, retroactive application of the TVPA is
appropriate in the Marcos case.
2. The TVPA Does Not Alter Substantive Rules of Conduct
The substantive/non-substantive distinction in statutes provides a
basis by which to determine the TVPA's application to pending cases. The
court in Weise v. Syracuse University utilized this distinction in disallowing
retroactivity of an amendment that imposed new substantive requirements
and thereby "creat[ed] new rights where none had previously existed."131
The same court in an earlier case had held that retroactive application was
proper where the amendment provided a new forum for the enforcement of
pre-existing rights. 132 By analogy, the TVPA provides a forum for litigants
whose suits arise from acts that occurred abroad. It does not change the
substantive law that existed before its enactment. As a jurisdictional statute,
the TVPA is essentially non-substantive. 133
A statute applies retroactively if it relates to modes of procedure and
does not otherwise alter substantive rights.134 In Denver R.G.W.R.R. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, the court determined the applicability of a
statute that expanded venue and found that it was completely procedural
because it did not change the substantive law applicable to the suit. The
court held that absent a contrary indication by Congress or any procedural
130 1973 PHIL. CONST., art. 1, § 3. The same text from the Marcos-era Constitution appears in art.
II, § 2 of' the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70 (1951), the
Supreme Court of the Philippines held that international law is part of the law of the Philippines and in-
cludes such principles as enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the
United Nations in 1948.
131 Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397,410 (2d Cir. 1975).
132 See Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), affd, 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
133 See Hilde E. Kahn, Completed Acts, Pending Cases, and Conflicting Presumptions: The
Retroactive Application of Legislation After Bradley, 13 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 231,248 (1990).
134 Friel, 751 F.2d at 1039.
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prejudice to the parties, the amendment should apply.135 Further, the First
Circuit has held that "where Congress has expanded the jurisdiction of the
courts in response to a perceived gap in a statutory jurisdictional scheme, it
is proper.., to apply" the presumption of retroactivity.136 Thus, insofar as
the TVPA expands federal court jurisdiction by removing an ambiguity in
the jurisdictional scheme, it must be held to be retroactive.
Besides being a jurisdictional statute, the TVPA can be construed as a
codification in response to a perceived need to clarify existing law. Enact-
ment of the statute was an explicit reaction to the concurrence by Judge
Bork in Tel-Oren, contending that a cause of action must be expressly
conferred by international law before a plaintiff can bring suit under the
Alien Tort Claims Act.137 The TVPA addressed this concern by reaffirming
the Filartiga principle that international law itself provides a right to a
private remedy. 138 To the extent that the TVPA was a pre-emptive strike
against Judge Bork's cause-of-action theory, the statute did not make a
substantive difference in enforceable rights and was primarily preventive in
effect. As a mere codification of pre-existing law, therefore, the TVPA
should be allowed retroactive application. 139
3. The TVPA Should Be Applied Retroactively Based on Rules of
Statutory Construction and Principles of Equity
Because the TVPA is silent on retroactivity and legislative history is
inconclusive on its application to pending cases, courts may rely on other
statutory interpretation devices in construing legislative intent. A common
approach is to consider the purpose of the legislative act as a whole to de-
termine if an intent to apply the act retroactively may be inferred. 140 A
statute that was enacted to clarify or restore an existing law may be
construed as indicative of legislative intent to support retroactive
application. 141
135 Denver R.G.W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556,563 (1967).
136 Demars v. First Serv. Bank for Say., 907 F.2d 1237, 1240 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1990).
137 S. Rep. No. 249 at 4-5; see generally Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798-823.
138 S. Rep. No. 249 at 4-5.
139 See Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929, 939 (7th Cir. 1992)
(noting that the retroactive provision in Bradley was a "mere codification of the law as it existed prior to its
enactment").
140 E.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075-77 (D. Colo. 1985).
141 Lussier, 904 F.2d at 666.
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Unlike the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which engendered debate on the
restorative purpose of the Act, the TVPA was unchallenged in its characteri-
zation as a statute clarifying existing law.142 Proponents of prospective
application of the Civil Rights Act have urged that in changing the standards
and penalties for discriminatory employment practices, the Civil Rights Act
has the substantive effect of an ex post facto law, that is, it punishes conduct
that was not unlawful at the time of occurrence. 143 By contrast, the TVPA
does not alter the legal consequences of acts that occurred prior to its
passage because the unlawfulness of the acts of torture and extrajudicial
killing has long been established.
Courts may discern an intent to apply the statute retroactively when
limiting it to prospective application would render it ineffective as to defeat
its basic purpose.144 In the case of the TVPA, enactment was deemed
necessary in order to correct the ambiguity of the centuries-old Alien Tort
Claims Act. 145 The legislative record of the TVPA contains numerous refer-
ences to its purpose of clarifying existing law, evincing Congress' intent to
make explicit that a means of civil redress exists for victims of torture.146
Accordingly, the TVPA was designed as specific and narrowly drawn legis-
lation providing a strong deterrent against torture. 147 If the primary aim of
the statute is to be given legal effect, courts must allow its retroactive
application.
An important canon of statutory construction requires that statutes
that interfere with antecedent rights should not be given retroactive
application unless the legislature clearly intended this effect.148 Nobody can
argue that a person had a pre-existing right to commit torture and
extrajudicial killing whether under Philippine law, United States law or
international law. Marcos is distinguishable from Jackson, which found that
it was fundamentally unfair to unexpectedly deprive a foreign state of its
grant of immunity. At no time could Marcos claim reliance on immunity
because he was amenable to suit under both the Alien Tort Claims Act and
142 Opponents of the TVPA's passage challenged it on other grounds such as inappropriateness of
forum and difficulties with management of foreign policy. See Minority Views of Messrs. Simpson and
Grassy, S. Rep. No. 249 at 13-15.
143 James H. Coil iM & Amy Weinstein, Past Sins or Future Transgressions: The Debate Over
Retroactive Application of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 18 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS L.J. 5, 22 (1992).
144 E.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 733 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) ("In order to be effective, CERCLA must reach past conduct").
145 135 CONG. REC. H6426 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989).
146 137 CONG. REc. H1 1,244 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Rep. Mazzoli); 135 CONG.
REC. S11,138 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989) (statement of Sen. Specter).
147 Id.
148 See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964).
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general federal question jurisdiction even prior to the TVPA's enactment. It
is hardly conceivable that the defendant's conduct would have differed had
he known that there was yet a third legal basis for bringing suit against him
in U.S. courts. Marcos flagrantly committed the heinous acts in full
awareness of the universal condemnation of torture according to established
law.
Cases cited by the defendant in Marcos in arguing for prospectivity
involved the application of legislation that diminishes property rights.149 In
such cases, retroactivity may not be presumed because applying the change
in the law would have resulted in unjustly depriving parties of rights that
had matured.150 However, the defendant's interests in Marcos are not akin
to a property right. Because Marcos did not have a pre-existing right to
torture individuals, it cannot be claimed that applying the newly enacted law
to the pending action would infringe upon any right of his that had matured.
No rights were subject to deprivation in applying the TVPA retroactively in
this case.
C. A Proposed Approach for Determining Retroactivity in TVPA Cases
The soundness of the Bradley decision supports its adoption in deter-
mining the retroactive application of the TVPA. However, this Comment's
proposed framework would add a second prong to the Bradley approach.
Instead of providing a presumption of retroactivity when the statute's
application is determined not to result in manifest injustice, the next step
would involve an equity determination.
Equity concerns underlie the debate on retroactivity.15l Potentially
unjust results stemming from retroactive laws include thwarted expectations
and deprivation of parties of notice.' 52 If these concerns are absent in retro-
active application of a statute, then a court should apply the law to pending
cases. Courts are hence able to make a reasoned judgment based on equity
principles.
149 See Defendant's Objection to and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Second Amendment to Pre-trial
Statements, Marcos (MDL No. 840); see also Bowen, 488 U.S. at 206-07 (noting that administrative
authority to apply retroactive cost-limit rule would require health care providers to return reimbursement
payments to the government); Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. at 79 (noting that retroactive application
of lien avoidance statute would divest pre-existing property interests).
150 See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 720.
151 Opponents of laws with clear retroactive provisions have thus far unsuccessfully challenged their
applicability on due process grounds. The lack of a constitutional basis for opposing retroactivity indicates
that principles of equity may form the basis for a presumption against retroactivity. Estrin, supra note 119.
152 Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 Tax. L. REV. 409,418-19 (1928).
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This approach naturally involves making a distinction between
substantive statutes, which apply prospectively only, and remedial or
procedural statutes, which apply retroactively. The predictability of the
outcome is based on the premise that statutes that affect substantive rights
are more likely to cause unfair surprise to parties who engaged in pre-Act
conduct, than a statute like the TVPA, which merely confirms original
expectations. Because the TVPA affords a remedy for an old wrong and
does not change the underlying legal obligation not to commit torture,
retroactive application is unlikely to produce an inequitable result.
In an equity determination, any disappointment of private
expectations must be balanced against the public interest in enforcement of
the statute.153 Defendants in TVPA claims may argue that they did not
anticipate being haled into court in the United States. However, this
contention ignores the fact that the substantive obligation not to commit
torture never wavered, and therefore, regardless of the forum, defendants
could not have reasonably relied on expectations that they were immune
from suit for their violative acts. Torture with impunity is not a valid
expectation interest. The public interest in deterring and punishing gross
human rights violations greatly outweighs a minimal impact on the rights of
defendants.
Thus, while equity principles prohibit applying a statute retroactively
to punish conduct if the conduct was legal when it occurred, such is not the
case in TVPA claims. As demonstrated in Marcos, retroactive application
of the TVPA does not alter the legal consequences of acts that preceded the
statute. Because torture and extrajudicial murder have been regarded as
violations of the law of nations for decades, the TVPA can and should apply
to claims for torture that occurred prior to the passage of the Act.
CONCLUSION
Since Supreme Court precedents are conflicting and the TVPA is
silent as to its retroactive application, the courts need to make a clear
directive on this issue. Courts should focus on the principles espoused in
Bradley as well as on equity concerns which underlie the retroactivity
debate. The distinction between the substantive and non-substantive nature
of statutes should also factor into the determination of retroactivity of the
TVPA.
153 Demars, 907 F.2d at 1240.
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Application of the Torture Victim Protection Act to pending cases
does not implicate any of the potential dangers associated with retroactivity.
Because no pre-existing right to torture nor immunity from suit exists, the
imposition of the TVPA does not itself upset settled expectations nor
deprive parties of notice. The statute is primarily procedural, in providing
torture victims a forum in federal courts after they have exhausted domestic
alternatives. In its enactment, Congress has stated that it was reaffirming
principles embodied in already existing law. Thus, the TVPA should apply
retroactively if it is to achieve its stated objectives. Sound legal bases and
principles of justice compel this conclusion.
